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Abstract
We investigated the role of individual differences in cognitive reflection in decision making. We measured the per-
formance of 157 participants in the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005) and a number of decision-making tasks.
We examined the relation of cognitive reflection with performance in tasks that assess correspondence (as distinct from
coherence), such as predicting the ratings of chess players. We found significant correlations between cognitive reflec-
tion and all the estimation measures in correspondence tasks. Our results suggest that cognitive reflection is a thinking
disposition that includes more characteristics than originally proposed by Frederick (2005). We proposed that cognitive
reflection is related to the concept of actively open-minded thinking (Baron, 1985, 2008). We concluded that cognitive
reflection is a thinking disposition that interacts with knowledge, domain-specific heuristics and characteristics of the
environment and that it may play an essential role in the adaptation of the decision maker to different environments and
situations.
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1 Introduction
Humans often violate the tenets of rationality as ruled by
logic, statistics, expected utility theory or other norma-
tive models of rational decision making (Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1974, 1983; Simon, 1955). Instead of making
decisions or judgments based on those models, humans
tend to use heuristics that sometimes lead them to commit
systematic errors or biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974,
1983). Nonetheless, not all humans are biased, some of
them perform as if they use normative models of ratio-
nality (Stanovich & West, 1998, 1999, 2000). Numerous
studies have shown that adherence to normative princi-
ples and cognitive abilities or thinking dispositions are
positively related (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Cokely &
Kelley, 2009; Frederick, 2005; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005;
Peters & Levin, 2008; Oechssler et al., 2009; Stanovich &
West, 1998, 1999, 2000). This article aims to investigate
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the role of a thinking disposition — cognitive reflection
— in decision making.
Frederick (2005) defined cognitive reflection as the
“ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that
first comes to mind” (pp. 35), and developed the cogni-
tive reflection test (CRT) in order to measure this thinking
disposition. Frederick also proposed a more general con-
ception of cognitive reflection based on dual-system the-
ories (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996;
Stanovich & West, 2000). Briefly, dual-system theories
propose that humans have two cognitive systems: System
1’s processes are quick, effortless, intuitive and heuris-
tic, and System 2’s processes are slow, effortful, reflec-
tive and rule-based. Based on a default-interventionist
conception of System 2 (Evans, 2008), Frederick (2005)
identified two characteristics of System 2 related to cog-
nitive reflection: its capacity to monitor System 1’s out-
puts and its capacity to override System 1’s functioning.
Research has shown that individual differences in CRT
play a role in individual’s decisions and judgments on
tasks where their behavior could be compared to predic-
tions of normative models (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Fred-
erick, 2005; Oechssler et al., 2009). Those studies found
that CRT was positively related to choices predicted by
expected utility theory (see von Neumann & Morgen-
stern, 1947) in risky choice tasks. Note, however, that
Frederick (2005) also found that, in the domain of gains,
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high CRT scorers chose more risky options than low CRT
scorers even when the expected value of the risk option
was lower than that of the safe option. In intertemporal
choice Frederick (2005) showed that CRT was positively
related with choosing patient options (i.e., high CRT scor-
ers had lower discount rates than that of low CRT scorers)
and Oechssler et al. (2009) found and almost significant
difference in the same direction. Furthermore, Oechssler
et al. (2009) found that high CRT scorers were better
than low CRT scorers at avoiding logical fallacies and
also they were less overconfident.
This article is concerned with three topics related to
cognitive reflection:
(1) Do individual differences in cognitive reflection, as
measured by CRT, influence behavior in correspondence
decision-making tasks (those in which accuracy is mea-
sured by an external criterion rather than by internal con-
sistency)?
(2) Does the CRT measure only the “ability or dis-
position to resist reporting the response that first comes
to mind”? Or does it also measure a broader disposi-
tion such as actively open-minded thinking (Baron, 1985,
2008)?
(3) Does general knowledge account for the influence
of cognitive reflection on decision making? Or does cog-
nitive reflection influence decision making independently
from general knowledge?
Correspondence tasks are those that test the correspon-
dence of participants’ estimations with facts of the world
(see Dunwoody, 2009, and Hammond, 1996, for a de-
tailed explanation of the correspondence, as well as the
coherence, criteria of assessment in judgment and deci-
sion making). For example, participant’s estimations of
number of inhabitants in cities are compared to actual
number of inhabitants in cities. The theoretical interest of
correspondence tasks is that good performance in them is
typically explained by participants’ use of fast-and-frugal
heuristics (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer
et al., 1999) and not by adherence to normative princi-
ples. As far as we are aware, the present study is the
first one in relating cognitive reflection, as measured by
CRT, with correspondence decision-making tasks. Previ-
ous research has shown that high CRT scorers engage in
heuristic behavior in tasks that investigate participants’
judgments but not whether these judgments match facts
of the world (Cokely et al., 2009). Cokely and Kelley
(2009) found that high performance in CRT was related to
more elaborative heuristic search. Based on these results
we predicted that cognitive reflection and performance
would be positively related in correspondence tasks in
which the use of heuristics is helpful.
The second topic we investigated was whether CRT
only measures a disposition to refrain from reporting an
intuitive response or that, as suggested by Cokely and
Kelley (2009), CRT also measures reflectiveness or thor-
oughness in decision making (Baron, 1985, 1990). If
this is the case, cognitive reflection, as measured by CRT,
would be a more general thinking disposition analogous
to Baron’s (1985, 2008) concept of actively open-minded
thinking. The third topic was concerned with alternative
explanations of the role of CRT in decision-making tasks.
Since CRT positively correlates with different types of
general knowledge — e.g., numeracy (Cokely & Kelley,
2009; for the concept of numeracy see Lipkus et al., 2001;
Peters & Levin, 2008) and academic achievement (Fred-
erick, 2005) — it could be argued that the relation be-
tween CRT and decision making is explained by individ-
ual differences in general knowledge. We tested this by
using tasks that did not require numeracy skills. More-
over, in one of these tasks participants could only use
their general knowledge indirectly (see Procedure for a
detailed explanation).
2 Method
The main goal of this study was to investigate the role of
cognitive reflection in correspondence decision-making
tasks. Additionally, we aimed to replicate previous find-
ings on the role of cognitive reflection in intertemporal
choice and risky choice. In the correspondence tasks we
used a familiar domain (cities) and an unfamiliar domain
(chess).
2.1 Participants
One hundred and fifty seven volunteers from Buenos
Aires metropolitan area participated in the study. The av-
erage age of the sample was 24.4 (S.D.: 5.4; range 16–
43). One hundred and ten of the participants were female.
2.2 Material
Participants filled in a 4-section booklet containing the
following tasks: CRT, intertemporal choice and risky
choice tasks, estimation of population of cities, and es-
timation of rating of chess players. The titles presented
in the booklet for each of the sections were “Problems”,
“Preferences”, “Cities” and “Chess players”. The “Prob-
lems” section contained the three CRT problems, as
shown in Frederick (2005). The Preferences section con-
tained some of the intertemporal choice and risky choice
questions reported by Frederick (2005). The Cities sec-
tion contained 4 tables with 5 columns (see Appendix 1
for one of the tables). The first column had the name
of cities (worldwide cities in tables 1 and 3, and Argen-
tine cities in tables 2 and 4). The rest of the columns
had to be filled out by participants. In the second col-
umn participants had to indicate whether they were aware
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of the existence of each city. The third column was la-
beled “country” in tables 1 and 3, and “province” in ta-
bles 2 and 4. Participants had to write down the name of
the country or that of the Argentine province where the
city is located. In the fourth and fifth columns partici-
pants had to estimate the population size of each city. In
the fourth column, participants had to sort each city onto
one of eight possible categories of number of inhabitants.
(See Appendix 1 for the range of number of inhabitants
in each category.) In the fifth column participants had to
estimate the exact number of inhabitants of the city. The
number of cities in each table was 16, 11, 11, and 10.
In Tables 3 and 4 we randomly chose cities from the top
100 most populated cities (top 100 worldwide cities and
top 100 Argentine cities, respectively). In Tables 1 and
2 we used known cities such as Paris (high population)
and Vatican City (low population) and less known cities
such as Dhaka (high population) and Kwinana (low pop-
ulation).
The “Chess Players” section contained 4 tables with 5
columns. (See Appendix 2 for one of the tables.) The first
column had the name of chess players (worldwide chess
players in tables 1 and 3, and Argentine chess players in
tables 2 and 4). The rest of the columns had to be filled
out by participants. In the second column participants
had to indicate whether they knew each chess player. The
third column was labeled “country”; participants had to
write down the nationality of the worldwide players (they
did not have to fill out this column in tables 2 and 4). In
the fourth and fifth columns participants had to estimate
the international rating of each chess player. In the fourth
column, participants had to sort each chess player onto
one of ten possible categories of chess rating. (See Ap-
pendix 2 for the range of ratings within each category.)
In order to give a reference to the participants, some cat-
egories contained labels such as “top 30 players of the
world” (see Appendix 2). In the fifth column participants
had to estimate the exact rating of each chess player. The
number of chess players in each table was 17, 10, 10, and
10. In Tables 3 and 4 we randomly chose chess play-
ers from the top 100 players in the international rating
(worldwide top 100 and Argentine top 100, respectively).
In Tables 1 and 2 we did the same but we also added non-
Slav players with high international rating and the two
Argentine players with Slav surnames and high rating.
2.3 Procedure
Some of the booklets were filled out in groups and some
of them individually. The instructions were written on the
booklet and researchers also briefed the participants. It
was emphasized that all the questions had to be answered
and all the cells on the tables had to be filled out. In very
few cases, participants handed in the booklet with a few
empty cells. In these cases, researchers asked the partici-
pants to fill out the complete booklet. As a consequence
of this procedure, there were no missing values. There
was no time limit to complete the task.
In the cities task participants could make their esti-
mations using their geographical knowledge directly or
indirectly. For example, their knowledge that Paris has
a couple of million of inhabitants and that Vatican City
is the smallest city on Earth, directly leads to an ap-
proximately accurate estimation of their population. On
the other hand, vague knowledge that Chinese cities are
highly populated may lead to high population estimations
on unknown cities the name of which seem Chinese. We
refer to this use of knowledge in estimations as “indirect”
because this knowledge is not on the value of the criterion
but on a somehow related cue. In the chess task, the only
way of using knowledge is indirect. Knowledge that Rus-
sians (or more generally, Slavs) are good at chess, may
lead to high rating estimations on players whose surname
seem Slav. The correlation between surname (being Slav
or non-Slav) and international rating was .49.
2.4 Variables
From the Problems section we obtained the number of
CRT problems correctly solved (range 0 to 3). The ques-
tions in the Preferences section were grouped into four
categories. In the first category — intertemporal choice
(ITC) — we calculated the proportion of patient choices.
In the other three categories — risky choices where the
expected value of the gamble was higher than the value
of the certain choice, in the domain of gains (HEVg);
risky choices where the expected value of the gamble was
lower than value of the certain choice, in the domain of
gains (LEVg); risky choices where the expected value of
the gamble was lower than the value of the certain op-
tion, in the domain of losses (LEVl) — we calculated the
proportion of risky choices.
In the Cities and Chess Players sections, we measured
participants’ general knowledge and participant’s abil-
ity to make estimations of facts in a relatively familiar
(cities) and in a completely unfamiliar (chess) domain.
In the Cities section, we used percentage of recognized
cities (RecCi) and percentage of correct geographical lo-
calizations (countries in worldwide cities, and provinces
in Argentine cities; LocCi) as measures of general knowl-
edge. Percentage of correct estimations of the population
category (Epop), and correlation between the log popu-
lation size reported in all cities and actual log population
size of those cities (rLgPop) were used as measures of
estimation of facts in a relatively familiar domain. In the
Chess Players section, we used percentage of recognized
chess players (RecCh) as a measure of domain-specific
knowledge of chess. Percentage of correct nationalities
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Table 1: Bivariate correlations, means, and s.d.’s for cog-
nitive reflection, intertemporal choice and risky choice
tasks. Pearson’s r correlation coefficient above the diag-
onal and uncorrected p values below the diagonal. CRT=
cognitive reflection test; ITC = intertemporal choice;
HEVg, LEVg and LEVl = risky choices in items where
the expected value of the risky option was higher than
that of the certain option (domain of gains), lower than
the certain option (domain of gains) and lower than the
certain option (domain of losses), respectively.
1 2 3 4 5
CRT ITC HEVg LEVg LEVl
1. CRT -.012 .258 .168 .037
2. ITC .8814 .036 .044 -.022
3. HEVg .0011 .6544 .382 .278
4. LEVg .0355 .5843 .0000 .214
5. LEVl .6455 .7845 .0004 .0071
Mean .656 .244 .353 .286 .331
S.D. .917 .206 .273 .289 .355
(NatCh), percentage of correct estimations of rating cat-
egory (Erat) and correlation between log rating reported
for all chess players and actual log rating of those players
(rLgRat) were used as measures of ability to use knowl-
edge indirectly to make estimations of facts in an un-
known domain. We also analyzed the relation of the vari-
ables sex and age with cognitive reflection.
2.5 Analyses
We computed bivariate correlations among all the vari-
ables. In this study we focused on the correlations of CRT
with intertemporal choice, with risky choice and with per-
formance in correspondence tasks. Based on Frederick’s
(2005) results we predicted a positive correlation between
CRT and ITC, HEVg and LEVg, and a negative correla-
tion in CRT-LEVl. Based on Cokely et al.’s (2009) and in
Cokely and Kelley’s (2009) results we predicted a posi-
tive correlation of CRT with the five estimation variables:
NatCh, Epop, Erat, rLgPop, rLgRat.
3 Results
The average number of correct CRT answers was 0.656
(S.D.= 0.9). 6% of the participants solved the three prob-
lems correctly, 11% of the participants solve 2 out of 3
problems correctly, 24% of the participants solve 1 prob-
lem correctly, and 59% of the participants solve no prob-
lems correctly. The average number of intuitive answers
was 2.038 (S. D.= 0.9). This result corroborates Fred-
erick’s (2005) observation that CRT problems prompt an
intuitive (wrong) answer.
Frederick (2005) reported that the average CRT was
significantly higher in men (Mean = 1.47) than in women
(Mean = 1.03). In the present study the average CRT
scores were 0.80 (S.D.= .92) for men, and .59 (S.D.= .91)
for women. This sex difference in CRT is in the same
direction of Frederick’s (2005) result; however, this dif-
ference was not significant: t (155) = 1.36, p = .175. Fred-
erick also reported that women committed more intuitive
errors than men. We did not find support to such claim.
The average number of intuitive errors in men was 1.95
(S.D. = .98), and that of women was 2.07 (S.D. = .93); the
comparison between means was not significant: t(155) =
.688, p = .486. The correlation between age and cogni-
tive reflection was almost significant (CRT-Age: r(155) =
.152, p = .0574).
3.1 Cognitive reflection, intertemporal
choice and risky choice
Table 1 shows the bivariate correlations among intertem-
poral choice and risky choice tasks, and between these
tasks and CRT. It also shows means and standard devia-
tions of each variable. The sample of the present study
could be considered impatient and safe. The majority of
choices were impatient in the intertemporal choice items
(75.6% impatient vs. 24.4% patient) and safe in the risky
choice items (35.3% risky vs. 64.7% safe; 28.6% risky
vs. 71.4% safe; and 33.1% risky vs. 66.9% safe in HEVg,
LEVg and LEVl, respectively). As shown in Table 1, the
prediction of positive correlation between ITC and CRT
was not corroborated (r(155) = -.012; p = .8814). A pos-
sible explanation of this result is that the previous three
years’ inflation rates in Argentina were 10.7%, 25.7%,
23%, for 2006, 2007 and 2008 (Bevacqua & Salvatore,
2009). Such high inflation rates might have caused a high
discount rate in all participants.
In accordance with previous research (Frederick, 2005;
Oechssler et al., 2009), cognitive reflection was positively
related to risk taking when expected value of gains on the
gamble was higher than the value of the safe option: CRT-
HEVg (r(155) = .258; p=.0011). Frederick (2005) also
found a tendency of high CRT scorers to gamble more
than low CRT scorers in the domain of gains, even when
gambles had a lower expected value than the value of the
safe option. We also found a positive significant corre-
lation (CRT-LEVg: r(155)= .134; p = .0355). Frederick
(2005) also found that low CRT scorers gambled signifi-
cantly more than high CRT scorers in gambles with lower
expected values than the values of the safe options, indi-
cating that high CRT scorers were more prone to accept
losses. We found a tendency to accept losses in the whole
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Table 2: Bivariate correlations, means, and s.d.’s for cognitive reflection and correspondence tasks. Pearson’s r correla-
tion coefficient above the diagonal and uncorrected p values below the diagonal. RecCi = recognition of cities; RecCh
= recognition of chess players; LocCi = geographical localization of cities; NatCh = nationality of chess players; Epop
= estimation of population (category); Erat = estimation of rating of chess players (category); rLgPop = correlation
between log actual and log reported population size; rLgRat = correlation between log actual and log reported rating
of chess players.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CRT RecCi RecCh LocCi NatCh Epop Erat rLgPop rLgRat
1. CRT .180 .013 .446 .267 .245 .226 .172 .274
2. RecCi .0241 .248 .471 .349 .106 .254 .368 .187
3. RecCh .8716 .0017 .153 .137 .027 .189 .214 .030
4. LocCi .0000 .0000 .0557 .401 .344 .221 .397 .282
5. NatCh .0007 .0000 .0871 .0000 .168 .155 .407 .309
6. Epop .0020 .1864 .7371 .0000 .0355 .131 .474 .163
7. Erat .0044 .0013 .0178 .0054 .0526 .1020 .152 .419
8. rLgPop .0312 .0000 .0071 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0574 .216
9. rLgRat .0005 .0190 .7092 .0003 .0000 .0414 .0000 .0066
Mean .656 .608 .008 .491 .176 .203 .130 .386 .213
S.D. .917 .104 .656 .102 .105 .072 .057 .203 .296
sample. Therefore, we did not found a negative correla-
tion between CRT and LEVl: CRT-LEVl (r(155) = .037;
p = .6455).
3.2 Cognitive reflection and correspon-
dence
Table 2 shows bivariate correlations among correspon-
dence tasks and between these tasks and CRT. It also
shows means and standard deviations of each variable.
On average, participants reported recognizing 60.8% of
the cities and 0.8% of the chess players. This result
supports our classification of the cities task as familiar
and the chess task as an unfamiliar. Cognitive reflection
was significantly correlated to recognition of worldwide
cities (CRT-RecCi, r(155) = .180, p = .0241), and, ex-
pectedly, was not related with recognition of chess play-
ers (CRT-RecCh, r(155) = .013; p = .8716). Participants
geographically located cities correctly in 49.1% of the
cases. There are two possible explanations of this 11.7%
decrease from recognition to geographical localization of
cities. First, some participants may be loose at report-
ing which cities they recognized. Second, some partici-
pants may have incomplete knowledge of cities (i.e., they
know that a city with a particular name exists, but they
do not know in which country it is located). The corre-
lation between cognitive reflection and geographical lo-
calization of cities was highly significant (CRT-LocCi,
r(155)= .446, p= .0000). This indicates that participants
scoring high in CRT have a more complete geographical
knowledge of the world than low CRT scorers. Interest-
ingly, participants were able to correctly indicate the na-
tionality of chess players in 17.6% of the cases, and the
correlation of this variable with cognitive reflection was
significant (CRT-NatCh, r(155)= .267, p= .0007). This
result indicates that participants with higher cognitive re-
flection, instead of guessing, were able to use pieces of
general knowledge (e.g., surnames ending “ov” tend to be
Russian or Slav) to estimate unknown facts in unfamiliar
domains (e.g., Malakhov is a Russian chess player).
Regarding the estimation measures on the domain of
cities, participants accurately sorted cities onto categories
of number of inhabitants in 20.3% of the cases. This
was significantly better than chance (12.5% ): t(156) =
13.4, p = .0000. The average correlation between re-
ported city size and actual city size was .386. This av-
erage correlation was significantly different than chance
(average zero correlation): t(156) = 23.7, p = .0000. This
result indicates that participants were able to estimate the
population size of cities above chance, based on their
geographical knowledge of the world. Performance in
these tasks could be, at least in part, accounted for by
either exact factual knowledge of city populations (e.g.,
the knowledge that Buenos Aires has roughly 3 million
inhabitants) or by estimations based on fast and frugal
heuristics such as the recognition heuristic (Goldstein &
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Gigerenzer, 2002). For example, participants that recog-
nized Los Angeles and did not recognize Quezon City
may have estimated that the former has more inhabitants
than the latter. Cognitive reflection was related to per-
formance in these estimation tasks (CRT-Epop: r(155)=
.245, p= .0020; CRT-rLgPop: r(155)= .172, p= .0312).
These results support the idea that cognitive reflection is
related to possession (and use) of more general knowl-
edge (in this case, geographical knowledge). It remains
to be established whether cognitive reflection is also re-
lated to better use of fast and frugal heuristics. The fol-
lowing analysis of estimation performance in the domain
of chess provides relevant information about this issue.
Participants correctly allocated players onto chess rat-
ing categories in 13.0% of the cases. This was signifi-
cantly better than chance (10%): t(156) = 6.6, p = .0000.
The average correlation between reported rating of chess
players and actual rating was .213. This average correla-
tion was significantly different than chance (average zero
correlation): t(156) = 9.0, p = .0000. This result indi-
cates that participants were able to estimate the rating of
chess players above chance. This is remarkable because
participants were not familiar with the domain of chess
and they did not know the chess players. How could
they perform above chance? Participants could only use
heuristics based on knowledge on related cues. For exam-
ple, knowledge that Russians are good at chess could be
used to estimate higher ratings for players the surnames
of whom seem Russian (e.g., Guseinov). These measures
on estimation also correlated significantly with cognitive
reflection (CRT-Erat: r(155) = .226, p = .0044; CRT-
rLgRat: r(155) = .274, p = .0005). There is a possibil-
ity that the few participants that knew some of the chess
players (there was a 0.8% average recognition of chess
players) were also high CRT scorers and that this would
account for the relation between CRT and estimation of
chess ratings. However, as shown in Figure 1, the correla-
tion between RecCh and CRT was not significant (r (155)
= .013, p = .8716) and the partial correlations of CRT with
Erat and with rLgrat controlling for RecCh were almost
the same as the zero-order correlations (r (154) = .227, p
= .004, and r (154) = .274, p = .001, respectively).
This result suggests that cognitive reflection is related
to the use of heuristics based on knowledge on cues that
are somehow related to the criterion.
4 Discussion
The link between cognitive reflection, as measured by
CRT, and decision making was established in risky
choices and intertemporal choices (Cokely & Kelley,
2009; Frederick, 2005). Also, cognitive reflection
was found to be related with the avoidance of biases
(Oechssler et al., 2009). The first goal of this article was
to investigate the role of cognitive reflection in correspon-
dence decision-making tasks. Results supported our hy-
pothesis that CRT would be positively correlated with 5
estimation measures in correspondence tasks. This find-
ing extends the scope of the influence of cognitive reflec-
tion in decision-making tasks.
Frederick’s (2005) explanation of performance in CRT
is based on a default-interventionist type of dual-system
theory of cognitive processing. Frederick suggests that
when participants try to solve CRT problems, their Sys-
tem 1 generates a quick, intuitive option. System 2’s duty
is to monitor System 1’s output and to override its func-
tioning if necessary. Most people tend to answer the in-
tuitive option because of System 2’s “laziness”. How-
ever, there are some reflective individuals whose Sys-
tem 2 overrides System 1’s functioning, find out that the
intuitive option is wrong, and carry out the appropriate
computations to solve problems. A similar explanation
could be offered for the role of cognitive reflection in
risky choices. System 1 may quickly propose a biased
option. An industrious System 2 overrides the heuristic
process that generated this option and engages in rule-
based thinking.
However, the observed good performance in the chess
task requires an explanation that should include more fac-
tors. In accordance with Frederick’s (2005) explanation,
in the chess task, System 1 may suggest guessing and
System 2 may override System 1 and not give up too
soon. However, in this case, the next step is not to en-
gage in rule-based thinking. Instead, performance above
chance is explained by initiation of heuristic processing
(i. e., searching for superficial cues and use of heuristics
based on general knowledge of the world). This analy-
sis accords with Cokely and Kelley’s (2009) suggestion
that CRT measures reflectiveness — i.e., careful, thor-
ough, elaborative search and less impulsiveness (Baron,
1985, 2008). Think aloud protocols presented in Cokely
and Kelley’s (2009) study suggest that even normative
answers in risky choice tasks are not accounted for by
participant’s calculations of expected value but by their
elaborate heuristic search. Cokely et al. (2009) found
that high CRT scorers used heuristics in situations where
no normative models of rational decision making were
useful, even when using these heuristics not necessar-
ily increased their performance. Baron’s (1985, 2008)
concept of actively open-minded thinking refers, among
other things, to the disposition for searching for more
possibilities before making an inference. Participants in
the chess task on the present study, in Cokely et al. (2009)
and in Cokely and Kelley (2009) seem to do just that. In
the present study participants search for cues provided
by the surnames of the chess players, in Cokely et al.
(2009) they search for superficial cues (e.g., superficial
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features of a Euro note, physical aspect of an expert), and
in Cokely and Kelley (2009) they search for reasons to
choose options.
Frederick (2005) acknowledged that there are alterna-
tive explanations for the observed correlations between
CRT and decision-making tasks. CRT may be measuring
other skills rather than cognitive reflection; for example,
numeracy or the skills needed for academic achievement.
There are three facts that may lead to interpret the effect
of CRT on decision making as modulated by numeracy:
(a) finding the solution of CRT problems requires math-
ematical knowledge; (b) previous studies showed signif-
icant correlations of CRT with numeracy and with SAT
math scores; (c) investigations of relation of CRT with
decision making typically used tasks with mathemati-
cal components (e.g., risky choice, intertemporal choice).
Although they had numbers, the correspondence tasks
used in the present study did not require mathematical
calculations. Therefore, at least in the present study, the
influence of cognitive reflection in decision making was
not mediated by numeracy.
Similar reasons could be put forward to interpret the
effect of CRT on decision making as mediated by in-
dividual differences in general knowledge, as measured
be academic achievement: (a) finding the solution of
CRT problems requires general knowledge (e.g., seman-
tic knowledge of the terms used in the CRT problems);
(b) previous studies showed a significant correlation be-
tween CRT and academic achievement (i.e., ACT and
SAT scores); (c) investigations of relation of CRT with
decision making typically used tasks in which general
knowledge directly helps in solving them. The role of
general knowledge (i. e., geographical knowledge of na-
tionality of types of surnames) in the chess task used
in the present study could not have been used straight-
forwardly to perform above chance. Participants had to
actively decide that this apparently irrelevant knowledge
could be useful, to combine this knowledge with another
piece of knowledge sometimes reported be media (i. e.,
Russians have been dominating chess for a long time)
and to use this to make their estimations. Thus, there
is a hint in the present study that, as suggested by Freder-
ick (2005), individual differences in cognitive reflection
independently influence performance in decision-making
tasks.
5 Conclusions
Research has shown that CRT correlates significantly
with academic achievement, intellectual abilities, need
for cognition, numeracy, working memory, elaborative
heuristic search, avoidance of biases, normative intertem-
poral choices and normative risky choices (see Cokely &
Kelley, 2009; Frederick, 2005; Oechssler et al., 2009). It
has also been shown that in risky choices, cognitive re-
flection is not always related to normative choices, but it
is also related to a preference for risk (Frederick, 2005).
The finding in the present study that CRT correlates sig-
nificantly with performance in a task without mathemat-
ics and in which general knowledge has only an indirect
influence, provides some support for Frederick’s (2005)
claim that the correlations between CRT and decision-
making tasks are not only explained by individual differ-
ences in general knowledge or cognitive abilities. Our re-
sults also suggest that cognitive reflection does not only
refer to the ability to monitor and to override heuristic
processes, but it also refers to the disposition to initiate
heuristic processing in appropriate situations.
Based on these results we proposed that cognitive
reflection, as measured by CRT, is related to Baron’s
(2008) broader concept of actively open-minded think-
ing. Stanovich and West (1998, 1999) used a scale
that measured actively open-minded thinking. They
found that individual differences in this thinking dispo-
sition were related to individual differences in a num-
ber of decision-making tasks (but not in correspondence
decision-making tasks). A possible avenue of further
studies would be the investigation of the relation between
CRT and the actively open-minded thinking scale used by
Stanovich and West (1998, 1999), and whether this scale
is also related to good performance in correspondence
tasks. These studies would strengthen (or weaken) our
proposal of linking cognitive reflection to actively open-
minded thinking.
Our study suggests that cognitive reflection is a think-
ing disposition that interacts with knowledge, prefer-
ences, heuristics and characteristics of the environment.
There are several proposals on the adaptability of the
decision maker (e.g., Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Bröder,
2003; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Payne et al, 1993).
Based on the results of our study, we suggest that cog-
nitive reflection plays an important role in the adaptation
of individuals to different environments and situations.
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Appendix 1. Estimation of population of cities.
Categories:
a) less than 50.000 inhabitants
b) between 50.000 and 100.000 inhab.
c) between 100.001 and 250.000 inhab.
d) between 250.001 and 500.000 inhab.
e) between 500.001 and 1.000.000 inhab.
f) between 1.000.001 and 2.500.000 inhab.
g) between 2.500.001 and 5.000.000 inhab.
h) more than 5.000.000 inhab.
Foreign cities.
Do you know it? Country Number of inhabitants












Percentage of correct answers in each
column
% % --------------
Note. The data obtained in the last row were not reported in this study.
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Appendix 2. Estimation of ratings of chess players.
Categories of Elo chess rating
a) less than 2350 Elo points
National Masters b) 2350–2400 Elo points
c) 2401–2450 Elo points
International Masters d) 2451–2500 Elo points
e) 2501–2550 Elo points
International Grand Masters f) 2551–2600 Elo points
g) 2601–2650 Elo points
Top 80 players in the world h) 2651–2700 Elo points
Top 30 players in the world i) 2701–2750 Elo points
Top 10 players in the world j) more than 2750 Elo points
Foreign chess players.
Do you know him? Country ELO











Percentage of correct answers in each
column
% % --------------
Note. The data obtained in the last row were not reported in this study.
